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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Joseph Nagle and Ernest Fink were co-owners and 
executives of concrete manufacturing and construction 
businesses.  The businesses entered into a relationship with a 
company owned by a person of Filipino descent.  His 
company would bid for subcontracts on Pennsylvania 
transportation projects as a disadvantaged business enterprise.  
If his company won the bid for the subcontract, Nagle and 
Fink’s businesses would perform all of the work. 
Fink pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud 
the United States.  Nagle proceeded to trial, where a jury 
found him guilty of a myriad of charges relating to the 
scheme.  Both defendants filed timely appeals.  Nagle 
challenges the District Court’s order denying his motion to 
suppress electronic evidence discovered during searches of 
the businesses’ offices.  Both defendants challenge the 
amount of loss the District Court found they were responsible 
for in calculating the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines 
range.  We will affirm Nagle’s conviction, vacate Nagle’s and 
Fink’s sentences, and remand for resentencing. 
I. 
A. 
The United States Department of Transportation 
provides funds to state transportation agencies to finance 
transportation projects.  These funds often go towards 
highway construction, provided through the Federal Highway 
Administration (“FHWA”), or towards mass transit systems, 
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provided through the Federal Transit Administration 
(“FTA”).  In Pennsylvania, the FHWA provides funds to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), 
and the FTA provides funds to the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”). 
Federal regulations require states that receive federal 
transportation funds to set annual goals for participation in 
transportation construction projects by disadvantaged 
business enterprises (“DBEs”).  49 C.F.R. § 26.21.  A DBE is 
a for-profit small business that is at least 51% owned by an 
individual or individuals who are both socially and 
economically disadvantaged and whose management and 
daily operations are controlled by one or more of the 
disadvantaged individuals who own it.  Id. § 26.5.  A state 
agency will announce a DBE-participation goal when 
soliciting bids for a contract, and bids for the contract must 
show how the contractor will meet the goal.  If the prime 
contractor is not a DBE, this is usually demonstrated by 
showing that certain subcontractors that will work on a 
contract are DBEs.  States themselves certify businesses as 
DBEs.  Id. § 26.81.  A business must be certified as a DBE 
before it or a prime contractor can rely on its DBE status in 
bidding for a contract.  Id. § 26.81(c). 
Most importantly here, in order to count towards a 
contract’s DBE participation, a DBE must “perform[] a 
commercially useful function on [the] contract.”  Id. 
§ 26.55(c).  Therefore, a certified DBE whose “role is limited 
to that of an extra participant in a transaction, contract, or 
project through which funds are passed in order to obtain the 
appearance of DBE participation” cannot be counted towards 
DBE participation.  Id. § 26.55(c)(2). 
B. 
In the 1950’s Joseph Nagle’s grandfather established 
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Schuylkill Products Inc. (“SPI”), a Pennsylvania-incorporated 
S-corporation, in Cressona, Pennsylvania.  SPI manufactured 
concrete beams that are used in highway construction 
projects.  In the 1980’s, the Nagle family also established 
CDS Engineers, Inc. (“CDS”), to operate as a construction 
company for the concrete beams SPI manufactured.  By 2004, 
CDS was a wholly-owned subsidiary of SPI.  Neither SPI nor 
CDS qualified as or was certified as a DBE in any state. 
In 1993, SPI was owned by two people: Nagle’s father, 
Gordon, who owned 50.1% of SPI, and Fink, Nagle’s uncle 
by marriage, who owned 49.9%.  Gordon Nagle was the 
President and Chief Executive Officer of SPI, while Fink 
served as Vice-President and General Manager of SPI.  That 
year, SPI entered into an arrangement with a company called 
Marikina Engineers and Construction Corp. (“Marikina”).  
Marikina was a Connecticut corporation owned and managed 
by Romeo P. Cruz, an American citizen of Filipino descent.  
Because Cruz was of Filipino descent, Marikina qualified as a 
DBE for FHWA and FTA projects.  Marikina was certified as 
a DBE in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, among other states. 
SPI and Marikina agreed that Marikina would bid to 
serve as a subcontractor for PennDOT and SEPTA contracts 
that had DBE participation requirements.  If Marikina was 
selected for the subcontracts, SPI and CDS would perform all 
of the work on those contracts.  SPI and CDS would pay 
Marikina a fixed fee for its participation but otherwise keep 
the profits from the scheme. 
In practice, SPI identified subcontracts that SPI and 
CDS could fulfill, prepared the bid paperwork, and submitted 
the information to prime contractors in Marikina’s name.  SPI 
used stationery and email addresses bearing Marikina’s name 
to create this correspondence.  It also used Marikina’s log-in 
information to access PennDOT’s electronic contract 
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management system.  CDS employees who performed 
construction work on site used vehicles with magnetic 
placards of Marikina’s logo covering SPI’s and CDS’s logos.  
SPI and CDS employees used Marikina business cards and 
separate cell phones to disguise whom they worked for.  They 
also used a stamp of Cruz’s signature to endorse checks from 
the prime contractors for deposit into SPI’s bank accounts.  
Although Marikina’s payroll account paid CDS’s employees, 
CDS reimbursed Marikina for the labor costs. 
In 2004, Gordon Nagle passed away.  Joseph Nagle 
inherited his father’s 50.1% stake in SPI and assumed the 
titles of President and Chief Executive Officer.  At that time, 
Fink became the Chief Operating Officer and Chairman of the 
Board.  SPI’s relationship with Marikina lasted until March 
2008.  Between 1993 and March 2008, Marikina was awarded 
contracts under the PennDOT DBE program worth over $119 
million and contracts under the SEPTA DBE program worth 
over $16 million.  Between 2004 and March 2008, Marikina 
was awarded contracts under the DBE programs worth nearly 
$54 million. 
C. 
SPI’s and CDS’s offices were all located in the same 
compound in Cressona.  None of the offices was open to the 
public.  SPI’s administrative office was a converted, two-
story white house.  The house was subdivided into offices and 
cubicles.  Between twelve and fifteen people worked in the 
building, as well as Nagle and Fink.  CDS’s administrative 
office was also a converted house, owned by Fink and leased 
to CDS.  The compound contained a transportation building, a 
production building, and various parking lots.  In total, SPI 
and CDS employed around 140 individuals who worked in 
the compound. 
SPI and CDS purchased a computer for nearly every 
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employee who required one.  They also created a shared 
network over a server.  The twenty-five employees who had 
access to the network needed a user identification and 
password to access it.  The network itself was 
compartmentalized into drives.  Only five people, including 
Nagle and Fink, had access to all of the drives on the 
network.  Emails sent from or received by SPI or CDS 
accounts were stored on the network as well.  Nagle received 
a company computer, which he took home every night and 
used for business and personal purposes.  He never used any 
other employee’s computer. 
In October 2007, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) executed two search warrants at SPI’s and CDS’s 
offices.  The warrants authorized agents to seize “business 
records of [Marikina] and all predecessors and affiliated 
operating entities, [SPI,] and CDS . . . including any and all” 
financial documents; contracts and invoices; payroll 
documents and personnel files; email and correspondence; 
phone records and calendars; and “[c]omputers and computer 
equipment.”  Nagle Supp. App. at 5, 65.  During their search 
of SPI’s and CDS’s offices pursuant to the warrants, agents 
found eleven computers and the shared network server.  The 
agents imaged the computers on site.  Nagle had brought his 
computer home with him before the search, so it was not 
seized and imaged. 
D. 
In November 2009, a federal grand jury in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment against Nagle 
and Fink.  The indictment charged them with one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371; eleven counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1343; six counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1341; one count of conspiracy to engage in unlawful 
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monetary transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); 
and eleven counts of engaging in unlawful monetary 
transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.  Cruz, the 
owner of Marikina; Dennis Campbell, an SPI executive; and 
Timothy Hubler, a CDS executive, were indicted separately, 
pled guilty to the charges, and agreed to cooperate against 
Nagle and Fink. 
Nagle and Fink jointly moved to suppress the 
electronic evidence that the FBI agents had imaged from 
SPI’s and CDS’s computers and network server during the 
October 2007 search.  They argued (1) that the warrants were 
unconstitutional general warrants, (2) that the warrants were 
unconstitutionally overbroad, and (3) that the agents had 
executed the warrant in an unreasonable manner.  The United 
States opposed the motion, contesting each of the arguments 
and also suggesting that Nagle and Fink lacked the requisite 
privacy interest to challenge the searches.  The District Court 
held a hearing and took evidence.  Two FBI agents and an 
FBI employee testified about the preparation and execution of 
the warrants as well as the FBI’s review and analysis of the 
imaged data.  Nagle and Fink testified about the history and 
structure of SPI and CDS, the two companies’ computers and 
network use, and their own use of the companies’ computer 
infrastructure. 
After the hearing, Fink pled guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  Nagle, however, continued his challenge to the 
search.  In September 2010, the District Court denied Nagle’s 
suppression motion.  The District Court concluded that Nagle 
failed to show he had a personal expectation of privacy in the 
electronic information that the agents had imaged from SPI’s 
and CDS’s computers and network server.  The District Court 
reasoned that Nagle never used the other employees’ 
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computers and that “[w]hile [Nagle] may have had the 
expectation that, as President and CEO of SPI and CDS, the 
contents of the companies’ server would remain private, he 
had this expectation in his official capacity as an executive 
and officer of these corporations as opposed to himself as an 
individual.”  Nagle App. at 21-22.  Therefore, the District 
Court held that “Defendant has not demonstrated that any of 
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and thus his 
ownership of the companies whose records were seized is 
irrelevant.”  Nagle App. at 23-24. 
On April 5, 2012, after a trial, a jury found Nagle 
guilty on all of the charges presented in the indictment except 
for four of the wire fraud charges. 
E. 
Before deciding Nagle’s motion to suppress, the 
District Court began the process of sentencing Cruz, 
Campbell, and Hubler.  As part of that process, the District 
Court issued an opinion on the amount of loss they were 
responsible for, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, in order to calculate 
the appropriate Guidelines range.  See United States v. 
Campbell, No. 08-cr-7, 2010 WL 2650541 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 
2010) [hereinafter “the Campbell loss opinion”].  The District 
Court concluded that Application Note 3(F)(ii) to § 2B1.1 
was the appropriate legal standard to calculate the amount of 
loss; that under Note 3(F)(ii) the amount of loss was the face 
value of the contracts Marikina received; and that the 
defendants were not entitled to a credit against the loss for the 
work performed because they had not refunded the contract 
price to allow a legitimate DBE to perform the work.  Id. at 
*3-6. 
After Fink pled guilty and before Nagle’s trial, a 
Presentence Report (“PSR”) was prepared for him.  The PSR 
relied on the Campbell loss opinion to conclude that the loss 
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Fink was responsible for was the face value of the PennDOT 
and SEPTA contracts Marikina received while he was an 
executive: $135.8 million.  Under § 2B1.1(b), this amounted 
to a twenty-six-level increase in the Guidelines offense level.  
With other enhancements and adjustments, the PSR 
calculated Fink’s total offense level to be thirty-five and 
assigned him a criminal history category of I.  This 
corresponded to a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months of 
incarceration, which was reduced to 60 months pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 371.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). 
Fink objected to the loss calculation in the PSR on the 
basis that the proper loss amount was the pecuniary harm 
suffered by an actual DBE that did not receive the contracts—
in other words, the profit an actual DBE would have received 
on the contracts.  The District Court reserved ruling on the 
objection until after Nagle’s trial. 
After the jury’s verdict, a PSR was prepared for Nagle 
as well.  The PSR relied on the Campbell loss opinion to 
conclude that the loss Nagle was responsible for was the face 
value of the PennDOT and SEPTA contracts Marikina 
received while he was an executive: $53.9 million.  This 
amounted to a twenty-four-level increase in the Guidelines 
offense level.  With other enhancements, the PSR calculated 
Nagle’s total offense level to be forty and assigned him a 
criminal history category of I.  This corresponded to a 
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months of incarceration. 
Nagle objected to the loss calculation in the PSR on 
the grounds that (1) there was no evidence another DBE was 
willing to perform the contracts, (2) PennDOT and SEPTA 
received what they paid for under the contracts, and (3) the 
largest conceivable actual loss was the value of the contracts 
less overhead and expenses. 
In February 2014, the District Court held a joint 
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hearing to address the issue of the amount of loss for both 
defendants.  At the hearing, in addition to arguing that the 
proper loss amount was the face value of the Marikina 
contracts, the Government introduced evidence pertaining to 
the gross profits earned by SPI and CDS on the Marikina 
contracts during Fink’s and Nagle’s respective tenures as 
executives.  Fink and Nagle both contested the profit 
amounts, which the Government asserted were several 
million dollars. 
On May 7, 2014, the District Court held that Nagle 
was responsible for $53.9 million in losses and that no credit 
was permitted.  On May 16, 2014, the District Court held that 
Fink was responsible for $135.8 million and that no credit 
was permitted. 
The District Court then requested briefing on the 
appropriate amount of restitution.  After briefing, the District 
Court rejected the Government’s argument that the 
appropriate amount of restitution was the same as the amount 
of loss under the Guidelines.  The District Court reasoned that 
SPI and CDS fully performed the contracts, so the 
Government received what it paid for.  The District Court 
held that the Government was only entitled to the difference 
between the face value of the contracts and what it would 
have paid SPI and CDS knowing that they were not DBEs.  
However, because the Government failed to prove what this 
difference was, the District Court found that no restitution 
was appropriate. 
The District Court sentenced Nagle first.  He requested 
a ten-level downward departure in his offense level.  Under 
the Guidelines, this corresponded to a loss amount of between 
$400,000 and $1 million.  The District Court granted the 
departure and additionally lowered another enhancement by 
one level.  With a final offense level of twenty-nine, the 
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District Court calculated Nagle’s Guidelines range to be 87 to 
108 months of incarceration.  The District Court sentenced 
him to 84 months of incarceration, one year of supervised 
release, a $25,000 fine, a $2,600 special assessment, and no 
restitution. 
The District Court then sentenced Fink.  The 
Government moved for Fink to receive a ten-level downward 
departure in his offense level.  Under the Guidelines, this 
corresponded to a loss amount of between $1 million and $2.5 
million.  The District Court granted the departure and lowered 
another enhancement by one level.  With a final offense level 
of twenty-four, the District Court calculated Fink’s 
Guidelines range to be 51 to 60 months of incarceration.  The 
District Court sentenced him to 51 months of incarceration, 
one year of supervised release, a $25,000 fine, a $100 special 
assessment, and no restitution. 
Nagle and Fink filed timely appeals.1 
II. 
We first consider Nagle’s challenge to the District 
Court’s order denying his motion to suppress the electronic 
evidence seized from SPI’s and CDS’s offices.  The District 
Court denied the motion because it concluded that Nagle did 
not show that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the places searched or items seized.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions but review 
its factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Silveus, 
542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d Cir. 2008). 
A defendant who seeks to suppress evidence allegedly 
seized or discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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must first demonstrate that the Government physically 
occupied his property for the purpose of obtaining 
information or that he had “a legitimate expectation of 
privacy that has been invaded by government action.”  Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (“Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, 
may not be vicariously asserted.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  To have a legitimate expectation of privacy, the 
defendant must show “an actual or subjective expectation of 
privacy in the subject of the search or seizure” and show that 
“this expectation of privacy is objectively justifiable under 
the circumstances.”  United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 
298-99 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
other words, the expectation of privacy must be “one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”  Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).2 
No one disputes that SPI and CDS, as corporate 
entities, could challenge the search of their respective offices, 
whether through a motion to suppress—had they been 
                                              
2 This initial showing—that the defendant’s property 
or legitimate expectation of privacy has been invaded—has 
been frequently referred to as “Fourth Amendment standing,” 
to differentiate it from jurisdictional, Article III standing.  
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 163 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  However, “this aspect of the analysis belongs 
more properly under the heading of substantive Fourth 
Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing.”  
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 429. 
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charged with a crime—or through a Bivens3 action.  Nagle 
argues that because he is the majority owner of the small, 
family-operated corporations, he should have the same ability 
to challenge the searches that the corporations do.  In other 
words, Nagle says, because the Government physically 
intruded on the corporations’ property and otherwise invaded 
their legitimate expectations of privacy, and because he is the 
majority owner of the corporations, the Government 
physically intruded on his property and otherwise invaded his 
legitimate expectation of privacy.  In support of that 
argument, Nagle cites a line from New York v. Burger: “An 
owner or operator of a business . . . has an expectation of 
privacy in commercial property, which society is prepared to 
consider to be reasonable.”  482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987). 
But that expectation of privacy “is different from, and 
indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s 
home.”  Id. at 700.  Although the Supreme Court has not 
clarified precisely how much “less” of an expectation of 
privacy a business owner has in commercial premises, we see 
a consensus among the Courts of Appeals that a corporate 
shareholder has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
corporate property only if the shareholder demonstrates a 
personal expectation of privacy in the areas searched 
independent of his status as a shareholder. 
In United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., the 
defendants were part-owners of an incorporated business and 
sought to challenge a warrant authorizing a search of the 
corporation’s premises.  568 F.3d 684, 691, 694 (9th Cir. 
2009).  The Ninth Circuit rejected their argument that “mere 
ownership and management of” the corporation allowed them 
                                              
3 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
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to challenge the search of the corporation’s premises.  Id. at 
694.  This was because “a reasonable expectation of privacy 
does not arise ex officio, but must be established with respect 
to the person in question.”  Id. at 696.  However, the 
defendants could still show a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the corporation’s property if they “show[ed] some 
personal connection to the places searched and the materials 
seized” and “took precautions on [their] own behalf to secure 
the place searched or things seized from any interference 
without [their] authorization.”  Id. at 698.  The court 
remanded the matter for further fact finding. 
In United States v. Mohney, the defendant was the sole 
owner of an incorporated business and sought to challenge the 
search of the business’s headquarters.  949 F.2d 1397, 1399, 
1403 (6th Cir. 1991).  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
defendant failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Id. at 1404.  The court concluded,  
Where the documents seized were 
normal corporate records not personally 
prepared by the defendant and not taken 
from his personal office, desk, or files, in 
a search that was not directed at him 
personally, the defendant cannot 
challenge a search as he would not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
such materials. 
 
Id. at 1403. 
Mohney, in turn, relied on a decision of the Second 
Circuit in Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 
1946) (per curiam).  Lagow was the “sole shareholder and 
officer of [his] corporation” and sought an order forbidding 
the use of evidence seized from the corporation in any future 
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trial against him.  Id. at 246.  The court rejected his claim, 
reasoning that Lagow chose “to avail himself of the privilege 
of doing business as a corporation” and, therefore, “he may 
not vicariously take on the privilege of the corporation under 
the Fourth Amendment . . . .  Its wrongs are not his wrongs; 
its immunity is not his immunity.”  Id. 
Finally, in Williams v. Kunze, one of the plaintiffs was 
the sole shareholder and president of a corporation and 
brought a Bivens action against an IRS agent who searched 
the company’s records pursuant to a warrant.  806 F.2d 594, 
597 (5th Cir. 1986).  The Fifth Circuit found that summary 
judgment was properly granted to the federal agent because 
the shareholder could not challenge the search of the 
business’s premises.  Id. at 599.  “An individual’s status as 
the sole shareholder of a corporation is not always sufficient 
to confer upon him standing[4] to assert the corporation’s 
[F]ourth [A]mendment rights.  Unless the shareholder . . . can 
demonstrate a legitimate and reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the records seized,” he cannot challenge the search.  
Id. (citation omitted).  The court concluded that the 
shareholder could not show such a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in records seized from the common file room.  Id. at 
599-600. 
These decisions all support a common proposition: a 
shareholder may not challenge a search of corporate property 
merely because he is a shareholder, but he may challenge the 
search if he “show[ed] some personal connection to the places 
searched and the materials seized,” SDI Future Health, 568 
F.3d at 698, and protected those places or materials from 
outside intrusion.  
Even the cases in which a shareholder was permitted to 
                                              
4 See supra note 2. 
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challenge the search of corporate offices fall within this 
paradigm.  In United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., the 
shareholders of a corporation wished to challenge recordings 
from a wiretap placed in their corporation’s office.  412 F.3d 
1102, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit observed that 
“owners of the premises where an illegal wiretap occurs have 
standing[5] to challenge the interception, even if the owners 
did not participate in the intercepted conversations.”  Id.  
Because the shareholders owned the office themselves 
directly—and not indirectly through the corporation—the 
court found that they had the reasonable expectation of 
privacy necessary to challenge the wiretaps.  Id. at 1116-17.  
The shareholders in Gonzalez showed a personal connection 
to the place searched in that they were the actual, direct 
owners of the property, and they showed effort to keep the 
conversations there private.  Thus, Gonzalez falls within the 
larger circuit consensus. 
So does Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th 
Cir. 1961).  The defendant in Henzel was also the sole 
shareholder and president of his business, and he sought to 
challenge evidence seized from the corporation.  Id. at 650.  
The evidence seized was the corporation’s business records, 
which were located in his office and most of which he 
personally created.  Id. at 653.  The Fifth Circuit concluded 
that he, therefore, “had an interest in the property seized and 
premises searched.”  Id.  Again, Henzel showed a personal 
connection to the place searched—his office—and the items 
seized—records he personally created—and showed an effort 
to keep both private. 
We find this line of authority persuasive and adopt it.  
To show he can challenge the search of SPI’s and CDS’s 
                                              
5 See supra note 2. 
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offices and the seizure of the employees’ computers and 
network server as a shareholder and executive, Nagle must 
show a personal connection to the place searched or to the 
item seized and that he attempted to keep the place and item 
private.  Nagle has failed to meet this standard. 
The employees’ computers that were seized and 
imaged were discovered in the employees’ offices.  Nagle did 
not show that he used these employees’ offices, nor that he 
used their computers or accessed their files.  Accordingly, he 
failed to show a personal connection to the computers or the 
place where they were discovered. 
The server is, however, slightly more complicated.  
The server was not seized from his office.  Therefore, Nagle 
must show a personal connection to the electronic files 
located on the server and that he kept them private in order to 
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Nagle 
failed to show that he ever accessed other employees’ files 
and emails on the server and, therefore, failed to establish a 
personal connection to their files.  Although Nagle certainly 
had a personal connection to his own files and emails located 
on the server, he failed to show what efforts he made to keep 
his materials private from others.  Although the server was 
password protected and only five individuals, including 
Nagle, had access to every drive on the server, Nagle did not 
establish where his files and emails were located on the server 
and how many people had access to those drives.  Thus, 
Nagle did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate a 
subjective expectation of privacy in his files and emails on 
the server. 
For these reasons, we conclude that Nagle failed to 
establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the places searched and items seized or that the Government 
intruded onto his property.  See Free Speech Coal., 677 F.3d 
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at 543.  Therefore, the District Court properly denied the 
motion to suppress. 
III. 
A. 
Both Nagle and Fink challenge the District Court’s 
calculation of the amount of loss they were responsible for 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.  The District Court found 
that, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, they were responsible for the 
face value of the contracts Marikina received without any 
credit for work done on the contracts.  We review a criminal 
sentence for procedural and then substantive reasonableness.  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc).  Procedural reasonableness requires the District Court 
to calculate the correct advisory Guidelines sentencing range.  
Id.  When the calculation of the correct Guidelines range 
turns on an interpretation of “what constitutes loss” under the 
Guidelines, we exercise plenary review.  United States v. 
Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 309 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines governs the 
calculation of the offense level for crimes involving, among 
other things, fraud and deceit.  Subsection (a) provides the 
base offense level, which is either seven, if the offense has a 
maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years or more, or 
six.  Subsection (b) provides an extensive list of adjustments 
for offense-specific characteristics.  The first of these 
adjustments—and the one relevant to this appeal—is the 
adjustment for the amount of loss.  As the loss increases, the 
offense level increases: for example, if the loss is more than 
$70,000, the court adds eight to the offense level; if the loss is 
more than $100 million, the court adds twenty-six to the 
offense level. 
The main text of the Guidelines does not define “loss.”  
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Instead, we turn to the application notes that accompany 
§ 2B1.1.  We “keep in mind that [G]uidelines commentary, 
interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline, is 
binding on us when we are applying that guideline because 
we are obligated to adhere to the Commission’s definition.”  
United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 43 (1993)). 
Note 3(A) to § 2B1.1 states that “loss is the greater of 
actual loss or intended loss.”  “‘Actual loss’ means the 
reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the 
offense”; intended loss “means the pecuniary harm that was 
intended to result from the offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 
n.3(A)(i)-(ii).  In addition to this general definition, Note 3(F) 
gives some “special rules [to] be used to assist in determining 
loss” “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A).”  Id. cmt. n.3(F).  
One of these “special rules” is for “a case involving 
government benefits (e.g., grants, loans, entitlement program 
payments).”  Id. cmt. n.3(F)(ii).  In such a case,  
loss shall be considered to be not less 
than the value of the benefits obtained by 
unintended recipients or diverted to 
unintended uses, as the case may be.  For 
example, if the defendant was the 
intended recipient of food stamps having 
a value of $100 but fraudulently received 
food stamps having a value of $150, loss 
is $50. 
 
Id. 
Nagle and Fink insist that the amount of loss they are 
responsible for is not the face value of the contracts Marikina 
received; instead, they say that they are at least entitled to a 
credit for the services they performed on the contracts or that 
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the loss is $0.  They argue that the District Court should have 
used Note 3(A) to calculate the amount of loss instead of 
Note 3(F)(ii) because the DBE program is not a “government 
benefit” and that under Note 3(A) they should receive a credit 
for completing the subcontracts.  In the alternative, they argue 
that they are nonetheless entitled to a credit under Note 
3(F)(ii).  We need not decide whether the DBE program is a 
“government benefit” and, therefore, whether Note 3(A) or 
Note 3(F)(ii) applies; we conclude that under either 
application note, the amount of loss Nagle and Fink are 
responsible for is the face value of the contracts Marikina 
received minus the fair market value of the services they 
provided under the contracts.6 
1. 
Our case law makes clear that, in a normal fraud case, 
“where value passes in both directions [between defrauded 
and defrauder] . . . the victim’s loss will normally be the 
difference between the value he or she gave up and the value 
he or she received.”  United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 
825 (3d Cir. 1995).7  For example: 
We have repeatedly emphasized that the 
amount of loss in a fraud case, unlike 
                                              
6 Nagle and Fink rely heavily on the District Court’s 
restitution order to argue that the amount of loss is $0.  The 
Government did not file a cross-appeal for the restitution 
order, so it is not properly before us to determine whether it is 
correct or not.  The restitution order does not affect our 
analysis of how to calculate the amount of loss under the 
Guidelines. 
7 Dickler interpreted § 2F1.1 of the Guidelines, which 
at the time was a separate section concerning fraud and 
deceit.  However, in 2001, § 2F1.1 was merged into § 2B1.1. 
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that in a theft case, often depends on the 
actual value received by the defrauded 
victim.  Thus, when a defendant obtains 
a secured loan by means of fraudulent 
representations, the amount of loss is the 
difference between what the victim paid 
and the value of the security, because 
only that amount was actually lost. 
 
United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 210 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(Becker, C.J.) (citation omitted).  Relying on that logic, we 
concluded in Nathan that “[i]n a fraudulent procurement 
case” we calculate the amount of loss by “offset[ting] the 
contract price by the actual value of the components 
provided.”  Id.  This loss calculation is similar to a classic 
method of remedying fraud: rescission of any agreements and 
restitution of the reasonable value of what the parties 
exchanged.  See Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 889 (Pa. 
2007); Boyle v. Odell, 605 A.2d 1260, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992). 
Applying this well-established principle here, the 
defrauded parties—the transportation agencies—gave up the 
price of the contracts and received the performance on those 
contracts.  Therefore, we conclude that, if the standard 
definition of “loss” in Note 3(A) applies, the amount of loss 
Nagle and Fink are responsible for is the value of the 
contracts Marikina received less the value of performance on 
the contracts—the fair market value of the raw materials SPI 
provided and the labor CDS provided to transport and 
assemble those materials. 
2. 
We next turn to calculating the amount of loss 
assuming that the DBE program is a “government benefit” 
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and, therefore, the special rule of Note 3(F)(ii) applies.  Under 
Note 3(F)(ii), the “loss” is “not less than the value of the 
benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted to 
unintended uses.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii).  An 
example of this rule follows: “if the defendant was the 
intended recipient of food stamps having a value of $100 but 
fraudulently received food stamps having a value of $150, 
loss is $50.”  Id.  The Government argues that the “benefits” 
are the face value of the contracts that Marikina improperly 
received.  Nagle and Fink argue that the “benefits” are only 
the moneys that they “g[ot] and retain[ed] possession of,” that 
is, the profit SPI and CDS earned on the contracts.  Fink 
Reply Br. at 10 (internal quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted). 
We find the Government’s position persuasive, 
particularly in light of the goals of the DBE program.  The 
DBE program cares about who performs the work.  It 
assumes that performance of a contract allows a DBE to not 
only earn a profit on the deal but also to form connections 
with suppliers, labor, and others in the industry.  The profit 
earned, therefore, is not the only benefit the DBE obtains 
when it receives the contract.  Therefore, when SPI and CDS 
fraudulently received the transportation contracts, the DBE 
program assumed that all of the contract price was going 
towards benefiting a true DBE.  Instead, the entire contract 
price was put towards a different use: profiting SPI and CDS 
and improving their business connections. 
Nagle’s and Fink’s arguments to the contrary lose.  
They ask us to consider the definition of “benefit” under a 
different section of the Guidelines, § 2C1.1, governing 
offenses involving bribes in interpreting the term “benefit” 
for Note 3(F)(ii).  We disagree that the appropriate 
comparison for the term “government benefit” is the benefit 
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that is offered as a bribe to an official.  They also argue that 
the legislative history of § 2B1.1 shows that “benefit” means 
“net loss.”  See U.S.S.G. app. C, vol. II at 180-81 (2003).  We 
find that the reference to “net loss” in this history refers to the 
example given at the end of the application note: the loss is 
the difference between the benefits they were intended to 
receive and the benefits they fraudulently received.  Cf. 
United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Here, as explained above, SPI and CDS were not intended to 
receive the subcontracts, so the loss is the difference between 
the intended benefits—$0—and the actual benefits 
received—the full contract price.  Finally, they suggest that 
“benefit” only refers to the things got and retained and so 
means “profit.”  The DBE program allows true DBEs to form 
lasting relationships with suppliers, labor, and the broader 
industry; those relationships are things received and retained 
as a result of the program.  Therefore, we agree with the 
Government that, if Note 3(F)(ii) applies, the benefits 
diverted from their intended use or obtained by unintended 
recipients is the entire value of the contracts Marikina 
received. 
However, a different provision of the Guidelines 
requires a credit against the full face value of the contracts.  
Application Note 3(E)(i) to § 2B1.1 states that “the fair 
market value of the property returned and the services 
rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly 
with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was 
detected” shall be credited against the loss.  Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. 
n.3(E)(i).  Here, Note 3(E)(i) means that we must subtract the 
“fair market value” of the “services rendered” by SPI and 
CDS on the contracts before arriving at a final loss value.   
The Government’s argument that Nagle and Fink are 
not entitled to a credit under Note 3(E)(i) because as non-
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DBEs they did not “render any valuable services,” Fink Gov’t 
Br. at 35, is unpersuasive.  Although the DBE program cares 
about who performs the work, it also requires that the work 
be completed.  The transportation agencies required—and 
received—the construction of concrete materials.  They did 
not receive the entire benefit of their bargain, in that their 
interest in having a DBE perform the work was not fulfilled, 
but they did receive the benefit of having the building 
materials provided and assembled. 
The Government also argues that Note 3(E)(i) does not 
apply to the “special rule” of Note 3(F)(ii), but we disagree 
for two reasons.  First, the special rules of Note 3(F) apply 
“[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A).”  Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F).  
Thus, Note 3(F) only supplants Note 3(A) when it applies; it 
does not supplant the other subsections of Note 3.  Second, 
the drafters of Note 3 knew how to indicate that no credits 
would be permitted.  Note 3(F)(v), which governs certain 
types of misrepresentation schemes, specifically states that 
“loss shall include the amount paid for the property, services 
or goods transferred, rendered, or misrepresented, with no 
credit provided for the value of those items or services.”  Id. 
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(v).  Had the Sentencing Commission 
intended to preclude crediting services rendered against loss 
for Note 3(F)(ii), it would have used similar language as it 
used in Note 3(F)(v).8 
The Government’s primary argument is that other 
courts to have considered the issue of DBE fraud before us 
have not allowed a credit against the face value of the 
contracts received in calculating the loss.  We do not find 
                                              
8 At argument, the Government suggested we apply 
Note 3(F)(v) to calculate the loss on this appeal.  We decline 
to address an argument raised for the first time at argument. 
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those cases persuasive on this point.  First, two of the cases 
the Government relies on were decided using the previous 
Guidelines provision on fraud and deceit, § 2F1.1.  See 
United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(referring to § 2F1.1); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co. of 
Ohio, 219 F.3d 300, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).  This 
difference is important, because the old § 2F1.1 had an 
application note similar to current Note 3(F)(ii), which both 
courts relied on in reaching their holdings, but no application 
note similar to current Note 3(E)(i).  See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 
cmt. n.8(d) (2000).  Therefore, neither the Fourth nor Seventh 
Circuits had occasion to consider whether Note 3(E)(i) 
required that the services rendered be credited against the 
loss.  Second, although the Eleventh Circuit has also said that 
“the appropriate amount of loss . . . [is] the entire value of the 
. . . contracts that were diverted to the unintended recipient” 
under § 2B1.1,9 that court merely relied on Leahy and 
Brothers Construction and did not consider whether Note 
3(E)(i) made a difference in the analysis.  United States v. 
Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305-07 (11th Cir. 2009).  
Accordingly, we see nothing in these cases that convinces us 
that Notes 3(E)(i) and (F)(ii) do not work together to allow a 
credit for the fair market value of the services rendered 
                                              
9 The Government relies on similar language in our 
non-precedential opinion in United States v. Tulio, 263 F. 
App’x 258, 263 (3d Cir. 2008).  That case is, of course, not 
binding on this Court, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, and in any event 
only dealt with the issue in a cursory manner.  
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against the face value of the contracts.10 
3. 
We conclude that in a DBE fraud case, regardless of 
which application note is used, the District Court should 
calculate the amount of loss under § 2B1.1 by taking the face 
value of the contracts and subtracting the fair market value of 
the services rendered under those contracts.  This includes, 
for example, the fair market value of the materials supplied, 
the fair market cost of the labor necessary to assemble the 
materials, and the fair market value of transporting and 
storing the materials.  If possible and when relevant, the 
District Court should keep in mind the goals of the DBE 
program that have been frustrated by the fraud. 
B. 
The Government alternatively argues that the error in 
calculating the amount of loss for Nagle and Fink was 
harmless.  In the Government’s view, the ten-level departures 
that the District Court granted for both Nagle and Fink 
essentially assigned them the loss figures they now ask for.  
Therefore, because they were ultimately sentenced with a 
Guidelines range that corresponded to the loss figures they 
asked for, the Government says that the loss miscalculation 
                                              
10 The Government’s reliance on a worksheet from a 
Sentencing Commission training seminar is, therefore, 
misplaced.  The worksheet relies on Leahy and Tulio, which 
we have rejected, and on our opinion in Tupone.  We fail to 
see how Tupone supports the Government’s position here.  In 
Tupone, we concluded that the loss from a worker’s 
compensation fraud was the difference between what the 
worker received and should have received.  442 F.3d at 153-
56.  We did not address whether he was entitled to a credit for 
services rendered. 
 28 
 
had no effect on their sentences. 
An erroneous Guidelines calculation is harmless such 
that we may not grant relief if it is “clear that the error did not 
affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.”  
United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).  
“Even when the sentence is below the Guidelines range, the 
record must be unambiguous that the miscalculation of the 
range had no effect.”  Id. at 217.  Our review of the record 
indicates that the District Court’s miscalculation of the loss 
amount likely affected the sentences Nagle and Fink received 
even with the ten-level departures.  Of principal concern to us 
is that the District Court referred to the size of the loss it 
incorrectly calculated in sentencing Fink as one of the reasons 
for the sentence he received.  See Fink App. at 249.  Because 
it is not clear that the incorrect loss calculations did not affect 
the sentences imposed, we cannot conclude that the incorrect 
loss calculations were harmless. 
IV. 
For these reasons, we affirm Nagle’s judgment of 
conviction, vacate Nagle’s and Fink’s sentences, and remand 
for resentencing. 
 1 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. 
 I join all but Section III-A-2 of the opinion of the 
Court, and I concur in the judgment in full. Because the loss 
amount calculation in a DBE fraud case of this kind is 
governed by Application Note 3(A) to § 2B1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, I would hold that the “government 
benefits” provision does not apply here. 
 In United States v. Nathan, we characterized as 
“fraudulent procurement” a contractor’s false statements to 
the Government that it would comply with the Buy American 
Act by not using foreign components in performing the 
contracts at issue. 188 F.3d 190, 194, 210 (3d Cir. 1999); see 
also United States v. Biberfeld, 957 F.2d 98, 99 (3d Cir. 
1992) (describing as procurement fraud a contractor’s 
concealment of the fact that his supplies originated in 
Pakistan). As in Nathan, the defendants here conspired to lie 
to the Government about their compliance with federal 
regulations in order to receive contracts that otherwise would 
have gone to others. This is classic procurement fraud. 
 The Sentencing Guidelines make clear that the loss 
calculation in a procurement fraud case is covered by the 
“general rule” of Application Note 3(A). A subdivision of 
that note, Note 3(A)(v)(II), specifically addresses how Note 
3(A) is to be applied in procurement fraud cases. This 
suggests that Note 3(F)(ii), a “special rule” designed for cases 
involving the fraudulent receipt of public benefits like welfare 
payments, has no place in a procurement fraud case. I would 
therefore vacate and remand for the District Court to apply 
Note 3(A) in accordance with the guidance provided by the 
Court in Section III-A-1 of its opinion. 
